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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of Plaintiff Todd Allan Butters' failure to comply with the simple 
and well-established grievance process at the Idaho Correctional Center ("ICC") following two 
separate altercations with other inmates. Rather than submitting timely grievances to prison officials 
following the altercations, Butters instead brought a civil action against ICC employees, claiming 
they failed to protect him from the harm he faces as a result of his status as a sex offender. In 
neglecting to submit timely grievances with prison officials prior to filing his civil lawsuit, Butters 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by Idaho law. Consequently, Idaho's Fourlh 
Judicial District Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Butters now 
appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment, yet he has not submitted any evidence 
indicating that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, Butters' appeal must be 
dismissed. 
B. Factual and Procedural History 
1. ICC's Grievance Procedure 
ICC is a private corporation that houses inmates under the jurisdiction of the Idaho 
Department of Correction ("IDOC"). ICC follows the same grievance procedures as IDOC. R., p. 
61. IDOC Directive Number 316.02.01.001,' which was in effect between September 16,2004 and 
November 28,2007, sets forth a three-step inmate grievance process. R., p. 61, and Appendix A. 
' A copy of IDOC Directive Number 316.02.01.001 is attached hereto as Appendix A for 
the Court's convenience. 
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The three-step process requires an inmate to submit a concern form, a timely grievance form, and 
a timely grievance appeal form. Id.; App. A, Section 05.00.00 - 05.03.00. The inmate grievance 
procedure may be used for complaints regarding all policies, conditions of confinement, actions by 
employers, actions by other inmates, and incidents occurring within the jurisdiction of ICC that 
affect the inmate personally. Each facility provides a locked box for inmates to place concern, 
grievance, and appeal forms. Id.; App. A, Section 5.00.00. 
In order to comply with the ICC's grievance procedure, an inmate must try to solve 
an issue or problem informally by submitting a concern form before filing a grievance. Id., p. 62; 
App. A, Section 05.02.01. ICC staff should respond within seven working days of receiving a 
concern form. Id. If the issue cannot be resolved informally, an inmate may submit a grievance 
form. Id., p. 62; App. A, Section 05.02.02. Inmates are required to file the grievance form within 
fifteen davs of the incident or problem that is the basis of the grievance. The grievance must contain 
all information relating to the nature of the complaint. It must be specific as to dates, places, names 
of personnel involved, and how the offender has been adversely affected. The offender must also 
state the action that the offender believes the reviewing authority should take. Id. Additionally, 
inmates filing a grievance form must attach the concern form to the grievance in order to substantiate 
that they have taken steps to informally solve the issue. Id.; App. A, Section 05.02.02. 
If the grievance form is both timely and correctly submitted, it is assigned to the 
applicable ICC staff, but not the staff that responded to the concern form. The grievance coordinator 
then assigns the grievance a number and logs to whom the grievance is assigned. The assigned staff 
has seven working days to answer the grievance and return it to the grievance coordinator. After an 
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answer is received, the grievance coordinator logs the response and forwards the grievance to the 
reviewing authority for a decision. Id.; App. A, Section 05.02.02. 
The reviewing authority has fourteen working days to return the completed grievance 
to the grievance coordinator. After a response is received from the reviewing authority, the 
grievance coordinator logs the decision and returns the original (white) copy of the grievance to the 
inmate; the pink copy is forwarded to the Operations Deputy Administrator with the monthly 
Management Briefing report; the yellow copy is kept on file for five years and then destroyed. Id.; 
App. A, Section 05.02.02. 
If the inmate is not satisfied with the reviewing authority's response, he may appeal 
by returning the original (white) copy of the grievance to the grievance coordinator; the appeal must 
be filed within ten days of the reviewing authority's response. Id., p. 63; App. A., Section 05.03.00. 
When a grievance appeal is received, the grievance coordinator logs the appeal and forwards it to 
the appellate authority. The appellate authority has fourteen working days to respond and return the 
appeal to the grievance coordinator. After a response is received from the appellate authority, the 
grievance coordinator logs the appellate authority's response and forwards the completed appeal to 
the inmate. Id. 
Upon completion of all three steps - a submission of an inmate concern form, as well 
as a timely submission of both a grievance form and grievance appeal form - the inmate grievance 
process is exhausted. Id. 
2. Factual and Procedural Background 
Butters is a prisoner incarcerated at ICC under the jurisdiction of IDOC. Butters 
claims he has been assaulted twice during his incarceration. He claims he was first assaulted on 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 3. 
October 5,2007 because he is a sex offender. He claims the second assault occurred on October 15, 
2007. On October 30, 2007, twenty-five days after the first alleged incident, Butters submitted 
separate concern forms to Defendants Tammy McCall and Sara Fink. R., p. 99. In so doing, Butters 
specifically complained of the October 5 incident. However, neither concern form made any 
mention of the alleged October 15 assault. Id. Butters also claims to have submitted a grievance 
form on November 10,2007 complaining of the October 5 incident. However, the grievance form 
he claims to have submitted is not signed by an ICC staff member and the section entitled "For 
Administrative Use," which indicates the date a grievance is submitted to ICC, is not filled out. R., 
p. 100. Additionally, ICC has no record of Butters filing a grievance. R., p. 63-64. 
A year later, on October 1, 2008, Butters submitted a concern form to Defendant 
Brent Archibald and complained of the alleged October 5, 2007 assault. R., p. 101. Butters also 
complained, for the first time, of the alleged October 15,2007 assault. Id. Archibald responded by 
indicating that he did not find enough evidence to determine who participated in the assault. Id. On 
October 7, 2008, Butters submitted another concern form to Archibald, which reiterated the same 
complaints mentioned in the October 1,2008 concern form. Id. Arcbibald responded by referencing 
his earlier response. Id. 
On October 10,2008, Butters submitted a grievance appeal form. R., p. 102. In the 
appeal, Butters complained of the two alleged October 2007 assaults and mentioned that he filled 
out concern forms in both October 2007 and October 2008. Id. However, Butters made no mention 
of ever filling out and submitting a grievance form to ICC. Id. ICC Grievance Coordinator, Jennifer 
Gardner, responded to Butters' appeal by indicating that his grievance was untimely, as the alleged 
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assaults occurred over a year earlier, which was well past the required fifteen-day filing deadline. 
R., p. 103. 
On October 22,2008, Butters submitted a second grievance appeal form complaining 
of the assaults that allegedly took place more than a year earlier. R., p. 104. Gardner again 
responded by indicating that his appeal was untimely. R., p. 105. 
On April 10,2009, Butters filed a civil action against Philip Valdez, Daniel Prado, 
Joel Vance Young, Fermin Villiarreal, Shane Jepsen, Brent Archibald, Daniel Chaney, Brian Doser, 
Justin Acosta, Sara Fink, Flemming Green, Brian Titsworth, and Tammy McCall (collectively 
"Defendants") claiming they failed to prevent him from being harmed and have not taken action to 
alleviate the future risk of harm he faces as a result of his status as a sex offender. On July 17,2009, 
the district court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that Butters failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his claim. R., p. 130. The Court also noted that 
even if there was evidence that Butters exhausted his remedies, Counts 11, 111, and IV must be 
dismissed because there is no apparent or claimed basis for monetary damages based on a violation 
of Article 1, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. Id. 
Butters filed a Motion to Reconsider on July 30, 2009, claiming, inter alia, that 
Defendants failure to respond to his grievance resulted in a waiver of their ability to raise the 
exhaustion doctrine as a defense. However, the district court denied the motion on August, 10,2009, 
stating that "the issue of whether Plaintiff received a response to a grievance only becomes relevant 
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if there was a timely grievance filed. [Plaintiffj2 has introduced no new evidence that a timely 
grievance was filed." R., p. 141. Thus, the court denied Butters' motion. 
On August 27,2009, Butters appealed the district court's decision claiming thedistrict 
court erroneously determined that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Butters did not, 
however, appeal the district court's dismissal of Counts 11,111, and IV of his lawsuit on the grounds 
that monetary damages are not available in a private cause of action under Article 1, Section 6 of the 
Idaho Constitution. Therefore, he is precluded from raising the dismissal of those claims on appeal. 
11. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The sole issue on appeal is whether Butters failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies prior to filing his civil action when he (1) neglected to submit an inmate concern form for 
the alleged October 5, 2007 assault until ten days after the filing deadline; (2) neglected to submit 
an inmate concern form for the alleged October 15,2007 assault until nearly a year after the filing 
deadline; and (3) never properly submitted a grievance form for any alleged assault as required by 
ICC's grievance policy. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review utilized by 
this Court is the same standard used by the district court in initially ruling on the motion. 
Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434,436 (2008). Under Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c), sumrnaryjudgment 
The Court inadvertently referred to the Plaintiff as the Defendant in its Memorandum 
Decision. R., p. 141. 
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is to be rendered to the moving party if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In considering summary judgment the 
Court liberally construes all facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,684 (2005). 
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party may not 
rest on allegations in the pleadings, but must produce evidence by affidavit or deposition to 
contradict the assertions of the moving party. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 176 
(1974). A non-moving party may not rely on general or conclusory allegations unsupported by 
specific facts, particularly where opposing affidavits set forth specific and otherwise uncontroverted 
facts. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,902 (1997). Rather, a party must provide factual details of 
specificity equal to those furnished by his opponent. Bob Daniels and Son v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 
541 (1984). "A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment." Finholt v. Cresto, 
143 Idaho 894, 897 (2007) (emphasis added). Moreover, even disputed facts will not defeat 
summary judgment when the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential 
element of his of her case, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (1988), or when a plaintiff fails to 
establish a prima facie case on which he or she bears the burden of proof. State v. Shama Res. Ltd. 
P'ship, 127 Idaho 267,270 (1955). 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff's A ~ a e a l  Must be Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust his 
Administrative Remedies 
Idaho law requires prison inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies before 
bringing a civil action with respect to the conditions of their confinement. The Idaho Code states 
in pertinent part: 
Unless a petitioner who is a prisoner establishes to the satisfaction of 
the court that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, no 
petition for writ of habeas corpus or any other civil action shall be 
brought by any person confined in a state or county, or in a state, local 
or private correctional facility, with respect to conditions of 
confinement until all available administrative remedies have been 
exhausted. 
LC. 8 19-4206(1) (emphasis added).3 Although Idaho courts have had few opportunities to precisely 
define what it means for inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies, "[ilt is well established 
that to exhaust - literally, to draw out, to use up completely, see Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 
1989) - a prisoner must grieve his complaint about prison conditions up through the highest level 
of administrative review before filing suit." McCoy v. Goord, 255 F.Supp.2d 233,246 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (internal quotations omitted). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals emphatically agreed in Drennon v. Idaho State Corr. 
Inst., holding that "prisoners must exhaust available administrative remedies prior to bringing any 
civil action with respect to the conditions of his or her confinement . . . ." 145 Idaho 598,604 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (citing LC. 5 19-4206(1)). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals also held that the 
3A copy of LC. 8 19-4206 is attached hereto as Appendix B for the Court's convenience. 
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exhaustion doctrine may only be waived if an inmate is in imminent danger of physical harm or if 
the prison does not have a grievance system in place. Drennon, 145 Idaho at 604 (citing LC. 5 19- 
4206(1)). Otherwise, inmates must comply with the prison grievance system and grieve their 
complaints to the highest administrative level before filing a lawsuit in state court. LC. 5 19- 
4206(1). 
1. Plaintiff was Required to Exhaust his Administrative Remedies 
In Drennon, the Idaho Court of Appeal interpreted the scope of the exhaustion 
doctrine under LC. 5 19-4206(1) in the same manner in which nearly all federal courts have 
interpreted the exhaustion doctrine under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
("PLRA"), which is substantially similar to Idaho's exhaustion statute. The PLRA, as codified at 
42 U.S.C. lj 1997e(a), provides as follows: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
conditions under [42 U.S.C. 5 19831, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, 
prison or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
e~hausted."~ As a result of the similarity between Idaho's exhaustion statute and the PLRA's 
exhaustion requirement, this Court "may glean insight from the interpretations" of other courts as 
it often does when analyzing "similar or identical statutes." Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & 
Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 224 P.3d 458,463 (2008); see also, Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410,418 (1993); Ada County Assessor 
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425,431 (1993). 
Federal courts definitively hold that the exhaustion requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. 9 
1997e(a) applies to private prisons. Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9" Cir. 2006). 
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The United States Supreme Court has, on several occasions, discussed the integral 
purposes of the exhaustion doctrine in the context of prisoner lawsuits. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 
548 U.S. 81 (2006); Porter v. Nussle, U.S. 516 (2002). For example, in Ngo, the Supreme Court 
stated that the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is three-fold. 548 U.S. at 93. First, it "attempts 
to eliminateunwarranted federal-court interference with the administrationof prisons, and thus seeks 
to 'affor[d] conections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before 
allowing the initiation of a federal case."' Id. (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002)). 
Second, the PLRA's exhaustion doctrine "intended to reduce the quantity" of prisoner lawsuits. Id. 
at 93-94 (citing Nussle, 534 U.S. at 524) (internal quotation omitted). And third, the exhaustion 
doctrine is meant to "improve the quality of prisoner suits."' Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
The Court determined that proper exhaustion effectively serves all of these goals. 
With respect to the first goal, it stated that the exhaustion doctrine gives "prisoners an effective 
incentive to make full use of the prison grievance process and accordingly provides prisons with a 
fair opportunity to correct their own errors." Id. at 94. This is particularly notable in relation to state 
correctional systems because it is "difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger 
interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than 
the administration of its prisons." Id. (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 475,491-92 (1973)). 
Next, the Court reasoned that the exhaustion doctrine reduces the quantity of prisoner suits "because 
some prisoners are successful in the administrative process, and others are persuaded by the 
proceedings not to file an action in federal court." Id. at 94. In turn, this process helps "filter out 
some frivolous claims." Nussle, 534 U.S. at 624 (internal quotation omitted). Finally, the Court 
stated that proper exhaustion also improves the quality of prisoner suits that are eventually filed 
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"because proper exhaustion often results in the creation of an administrative record that is helpful 
to the court." Ngo, 548 U.S. at 94-95. It stated that "[wlhen a grievance is filed shortly after the 
event giving rise to the grievance, witnesses can be identified and questioned while memories are 
still fresh, and evidence can be gathered and preserved." Id. at 95. 
Due to thecrucial role the exhaustion doctrine plays in the prisoner grievance system, 
Idaho's inmate exhaustion statute requires all inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies, 
regardless of whether the relief sought is available. LC. I) 19-4206(1) states that inmates may not 
file any civil action relating to the conditions of their confinement until "all available administrative 
remedies have been exhausted." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, 42 U.S.C. I) 1997e(a) states that 
inmates may not file a lawsuit with respect to prison conditions "until such administrative remedies 
as are available are exhausted." (Emphasis added.) Like Idaho's inmate exhaustion statute, the 
PLRA's exhaustion statute requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies. 
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the term "available" in 
the context of PLRA's exhaustion statute inBooth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 73 1 (2001). In Booth, a state 
prisoner brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. I) 1983 alleging that prison guards assaulted 
him. He sought various forms of injunctive relief and money damages. However, the prison 
grievance system had no provision for the recovery of money damages. Before resorting to federal 
court, the prisoner filed an administrative grievance with the prison, but did not seek administrative 
review after he was denied relief. The prisoner's failure to seek administrative review with the prison 
resulted in the district court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to exhaust. The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Booth, 532 U.S. at 734-35. In appealing the decision to the United 
States Supreme Court, the prisoner alleged that the PLRA's exhaustion statute did not require him 
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to comply with the prison's grievance process because it could not provide the monetary relief he was 
seeking. Thus, he argued that the administrative remedy he sought was not "available" under 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Id. 
The Supreme Court rejected the prisoner's argument and affinned the dismissal of his 
complaint for failure to exhaust. Id. at 741. In so doing, the Court mandated that all prisoners must 
exhaust their administrative remedies under the PLRA, regardless of whether the relief sought is 
available. Id. Booth expressly rejected an interpretation of 42 U.S.C. $ 1997e(a) that would have 
required an effective remedy to actually be available. Instead, the Court noted that prior to the 
enactment of an amendment in 1995 that created the present version of the statute, courts had 
discretion to require a state inmate to exhaust "such . . . remedies as are available" but only if those 
remedies were "plain, speedy and effective." Id. at 739 (citing 42 U.S.C. $ 1997e(a) (1994 ed)). 
But, under the present statute, courts lack discretion to discard the exhaustion requirement. The 
Supreme Court concluded that exhaustion is a procedural requirement, rather than a substantive or 
result-driven one, and that the term "exhaust," in the context of the statute, requires exhaustion of 
a process, not exhaustion of possible relief. Id. Thus, the phrase, "such administrative remedies as 
are available" "requires a prisoner to exhaust the grievance procedures offered, whether or not the 
possible responses cover the specific relief the prisoner demands." Id. at 738. 
The Booth decision clearly supports the proposition that Idaho's inmate exhaustion 
statute requires all inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies regardless of whether the relief 
sought is available. As noted in Booth, prior to 1995, the PLRA's exhaustion statute required 
prisoners to exhaust their available remedies only if theremedies were "plain, speedy, andeffective." 
Id. at 740 (citing McCarthy v. Madigalz, 503 U.S. 140, 155-56 (1992)). However, the Idaho 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 12. 
legislature, in adopting its inmate exhaustion statute in 1992, purposely excluded the "plain, speedy, 
and effective" language that was then contained in the federal statute. See I.C. 5 19-4206(1). In so 
doing, the legislature clearly intended to require that all inmates exhaust their administrative 
remedies regardless of the remedy sought and regardless of whether the remedy is "plain, speedy, 
and effective." Three years later, in 1995, the federal government amended the PLRA's exhaustion 
requirement and also omitted the "plain, speedy, and effective" language. Thereafter, the United 
States Supreme Court interpreted the amended statute as requiring prisoners to exhaust their 
remedies regardless of the remedy sought. Booth, 532 U.S. at 738. Both the Idaho and federal 
inmate exhaustion statutes currently provide that a prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies 
before filing any action relating to prison conditions, and neither includes any language limiting the 
exhaustion requirement to situations where there is an "effective" remedy or where the relief 
requested is readily available or even possible. I.C. 3 19-4206(1); 42 U.S.C. 5 1997e(a). Thus, 
Idaho's inmate exhaustion statute clearly applies to Butters and he was required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies with ICC prior to filing his lawsuit. 
Significantly, Butters tacitly admits that the exhaustion doctrine applies to his claim, 
as he has never once disputed its applicability in any of his pleadings. Moreover, Butters does not 
claim that the exhaustion doctrine should be waived in his case under the two limited exceptions set 
forth in LC. 5 19-4206(1). Nor does Butters question the availability of ICC's grievance procedure 
or its applicability to inmates as set forth in ICC's supporting affidavit. R., p. 60-64. Rather, he 
argues that he complied with ICC's grievance process and therefore exhausted his administrative 
remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. Thus, because Butters admits that he was required to exhaust 
his administrative remedies, it is important to review the strict guidel.ines imposed by the exhaustion 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 13. 
doctrine. In so doing, the facts will clearly demonstrate that Butters failed to comply with ICC's 
three-step grievance process and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
2. Plaintiff Faited to TimeIv Cornulv with ICC's Three-Stea Grievance 
Policv and Therefore Failed to Proaerlv Exhaust his Administrative 
Remedies 
The United States Supreme Court held in Woodford v. Ngo that the exhaustion 
doctrine requires inmates to complete the administrative review process in accordance with aprison's 
applicable procedural rules, including filing deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit. 548 U.S. 
at 94. InNgo, a state prisoner was allegedly prohibited from participating in certain prison programs, 
including a variety of religious activities. Approximately six months after the restriction was 
imposed, the prisoner filed a prison grievance challenging that action. The grievance was rejected 
as untimely because it was not filed within fifteen working days of the action being challenged. Id. 
at 87. 
The prisoner brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 against prison 
officials challenging the restrictions on his participation in the prison programs. The district court 
dismissed the claim on the ground that the prisoner had not fully-exhausted his administrative 
remedies. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the prisoner exhausted his remedies becausenone 
remained available to him. The prisoner appealed and the United States Supreme Coua granted 
certiorari. Id. 
The question presented on appeal was whether a prisoner can satisfy the exhaustion 
doctrine by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. 
Id. at 83. The Supreme Court decidedly determined that the answer is no. In reversing the Ninth 
Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court determined that administrative law requires proper exhaustion 
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of remedies. It maintained that proper exhaustion requires prisoners to comply with a prison's 
deadlines and other critical procedural rules before filing a claim in court. Id. at 93-95. The Court 
noted that because the prisoner filed a grievance after the fifteen-day deadline, his grievance was 
untimely and he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. It therefore indicated that the 
prisoner's claim should be dismissed, as a failure to exhaust must carry a sanction in order to avoid 
a "toothless" exhaustion requirement. Id. at 95. 
In so holding, the Court repeatedly emphasized that a prisoner must comply with a 
prison's filing deadlines and procedural rules in order to satisfy purposes of the PLRA's exhaustion 
statute. Id. at 93-95. "The benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system 
is given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance. The prison grievance system wilI not have such 
an opportunity unless the grievant complies with the system's critical procedural rules." Id. at 95. 
To illustrate the importance of an exhaustion scheme that requires strict compliance with a prison's 
procedural rules and filing deadlines, the Court used the following example: 
"[A] prisoner wishing to bypass available administrative remedies could simply file 
a late grievance without providing any reason for failing to file on time. If the prison 
then rejects the grievance as untimely, the prisoner could proceed directly to federal 
court. And acceptance of the late grievance would not thwart the prisoner's wish to 
bypass the administrative process; the prisoner could easily achieve this by violating 
other procedural rules until the prison administration has no alternative but to dismiss 
the grievance on procedural grounds. We are confident that the PLRA did not create 
such a toothless scheme." 
Id. Consequently, the Supreme Court conclusively established that inmates may not proceed to court 
until they have exhausted their administrative remedies, which, by definition, requires them to 
strictly comply with all of the prison's procedural and filing deadlines. Id. at 95-96. 
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In the present case, Butters failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies in 
accordance with Ngo, as he did not comply with the deadlines and procedural rules of ICC's 
grievance process. IDOCDirective Number3 16.02.01.001, which was in effect between September 
16,2004 and November 28,2007, sets forth a three-step inmate grievance process. R., p. 61; Exhibit 
A. The three-step process requires an inmate to timely submit three separate forms: a concern form, 
a grievance form, and a grievance appeal form. Id.; App. A,, Section 05.00.00. An inmate must first 
attempt to solve a problem or issue by submitting a concern form before filing a grievance. If the 
issue cannot be resolved informally, an inmate must file a grievance form. However, ICC's 
grievance process requires that "[tlhe grievance be filed withinfifieen (15) days of the incident or 
problem that is the basis of the grievance." Id. (emphasis added.) 
Butters clearly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his civil 
action, as he (1) neglected to submit an inmate concern form for the alleged October 5,2007 assault 
until ten days after the filing deadline; (2) neglected to submit an inmate concern form for the alleged 
October 15, 2007 assault until nearly a year after the filing deadline; and (3) never properly 
submitted a grievance form for either alleged assault as required by ICC's grievance policy. 
With respect to the October 5,2007 altercation, Butters had fifteen days from the date 
of the incident, or until October 20, 2007, to submit both a concexn form and a grievance form to 
ICC. However, the concern forms Butters submitted to ICC and attached to his affidavit are dated 
October 30, 2007, which is twenty-five days after the altercation. R., p. 99. Clearly, his concern 
forms were untimely, as they were filed ten days late. With respect to the alleged October 15,2007 
altercation, Butters had another fifteen days, or until October 30,2007, to submit both a concern and 
grievance form to ICC. However, Butters failed to submit either form prior to the filing deadline. 
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Although Butters filed two separate concern forms on October 30, 2007, neither one made any 
mention of the alleged October 15 altercation. R., p. 99. Rather, they only mentioned the October 
5 altercation. The first time Butters ever submitted any form mentioning the October 15 incident to 
ICC was nearly a year later on October 1,2008. 
Even if Butters had properly submitted a timely grievance for either the October 5 or 
October 15.2007 altercations, he never filed a grievance form for either incident. Although Butters 
claims he submitted a grievance form on November 10,2007, R., pg. 94, it is clear that it was never 
submitted to ICC. The grievance form Butters submits for the record and claims to have submitted 
to ICC is not signed by an ICC staff member. R., p. 100. The section of the form entitled "For 
Administrative Use," which is where ICC staff makes a notation indicating when the form is 
submitted, is not filled out. Id. Additionally, ICC has no record of Butters ever filing a completed 
grievance. R., p. 63-64. Furthermore, Butter's own statements belie his claim. On October 10, 
2008, Butters submitted a grievance appeal form to ICC. R., pg. 102. In the appeal, Plaintiff 
referred to the alleged October 5 altercation and stated: "I was told that something would be done 
about it but nothing was. I want to know why sex offenders and old people are put in danger all the 
time. I have sent concern forms to Fink and Chaney at the time of the problem and now I have sent 
two concern forms to investigator Archibald." Id. Notably, Butters referenced the concern forms 
he submitted on October 30,2007, yet did not allege that he ever submitted a grievance form. The 
fact that he specifically mentions the concern forms but makes no mention of any grievance form 
indicates that he failed to file a grievance altogether. 
Regardless, even if Butters had filed a grievance on November 10,2007, as he claims, 
it still would have been untimely. As already discussed, ICC's grievance policy required Butters to 
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submit both a concern form and a grievance form within fifteen days of the incident giving rise to 
the grievance. Thus, he had until October 20, 2007 to file a grievance form for the October 5 
altercation, and until October 30,2007 to file a grievance form for the October 15 altercation. With 
respect to the October 5 altercation, Butters admits that he failed to submit a concern form until 
October 30,2007 -ten days after the filing deadline - and that he failed to submit a grievance form 
until November 10, 2007 -twenty days after the filing deadline. Clearly, Butters did not comply 
with ICC's filing deadlines with respect to the October 5 altercation. Moreover, Butters did not even 
attempt to file a grievance form with respect to the October 15 altercation and therefore waived his 
right to grieve the incident. The grievance form Butters claims to have submitted to ICC makes no 
mention of the October 15 altercation. Rather, he merely refers to the concern forms he filed on 
October 30,2007, which only mention the October 5, 2007 incident. In any event, even if Butters 
had not waived his right to grieve the October 15 altercation, he still failed to file the grievance form 
until November 10,2007, which was eleven days past the October 30,2007 deadline. 
Finally, as a result of Butters failure to submit timely concern and grievance forms, 
he also failed to submit a timely grievance appeal form with ICC. ICC's three-part grievance system 
allows inmates to appeal decisions with which they are not satisfied. In order to do so, they must 
first submit a concern form before also submitting a timely and procedurally sufficient grievance 
form. R., pg. 63; App. A,, Section 05.03.00. As previously mentioned, both of these forms must 
be submitted within fifteen days of the incident giving rise to the grievance. If an inmate properly 
submits these forms, an ICC staff member will issue a response, which is logged in ICC's grievance 
system and given to the complaining inmate. At that point, the inmate has ten days to appeal. Id. 
In the present case, Butters neglected to correctly fill out and submit timely concern and grievance 
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forms. Even if he had done so, Butters did not submit a grievance appeal form until October 10, 
2008, which was a year after the alleged assaults and well past the ten-day deadline. R., pg. 102. 
Butters clearly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his lawsuit. 
Although the Supreme Court in Ngo required inmates to strictly comply with a prison's filing 
deadlines and procedural rules in order to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine, Butters rejected ICC's 
three-step grievance system, ignored both its filing deadlines and procedural requirements, and 
instead insisted on a grievance process that enforces no deadlines and provides no penalties for 
haphazard and neglectful compliance. In so doing, he (1) neglected to submit an inmate concern 
form for the alleged October 5,2007 assault until ten days after the filing deadline; (2) neglected to 
submit an inmate concern form for the alleged October 15,2007 assault until nearly a year after the 
filing deadline; and (3) never properly submitted a grievance form for either alleged assault as 
required by ICC's grievance policy. Clearly, Butters didnot exhaust his administrative remedies and 
his appeal must be dismissed. 
3. ICC was not Reauired to Respond to Plaintiff's Untimelv and 
Procedurallv Deficient Grievance 
The record clearly indicates that Butters never filed a grievance with ICC. 
Nonetheless, assuming arguetzdo that he did file a grievance on November 10,2007 as he claims, 
he still did not exhaust his administrative remedies regardless of whether Defendants responded to 
his grievance. Butters claims that Defendants did not respond to his grievance and therefore waived 
their ability to rely on the exhaustion doctrine as a defense. In essence, he claims that he cannot be 
required to exhaust when Defendant's failed to respond to his grievance. Butters' allegation is 
without merit, as ICC is not required to respond to untimely and deficient grievances. 
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Idaho courts indicate that ICC staff is not obligated to respond to an inmate's untimely 
and procedurally deficient grievance. Drennon, 145 Idaho at 603-04. In Drennon, an Idaho inmate 
filed an action against various prison officials regarding the conditions of his confinement. The 
inmate did not comply with the prison's three-step grievance process, claiming that he was not 
required to exhaust in order to raise his tort claims. The district court dismissed the complaint, 
ruling that the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to I.C. 5 19-4206(1). 
Id. at 600-01. 
On appeal, the inmate alleged that he submitted several concern forms to prison 
officials as part of the administrativegrievance process. Id. at 603. However, he claimed that prison 
officials never responded to any of his forms and therefore suggested that he did not need to proceed 
with the exhaustion process. The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected the inmate's arguments and 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the inmate's complaint. In so doing, the Court indicated that 
it was immaterial whether or not prison officials responded to the inmate's complaints, as the inmate 
could not establish that he submitted a timely grievance form. Id. at 603-04. Therefore, the Court 
affirmed the district court's dismissal. Id. at 604. 
Butters correctly points out that some courts do hold that prisoners have satisfied the 
exhaustion requirement if they do not receive a response to their grievances from prison officials. 
See, Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7" Cir. 2006); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7" Cir. 
2002). However, those same courts hold that prison officials are not obligated to respond to 
untimely or otherwise deficient grievances. For example, in Pozo, a prisoner filed a timely 
complaint but thereafter filed an untimely grievance with prison officials. Id. at 1023. The prisoner 
filed suit and alleged that he attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies but the prison did not 
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respond to his grievance. Id. at 1025. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that prisoners have 
satisfied the exhaustion requirement when prison officials fail to respond to a timely and sufficient 
grievance. Nonetheless, the Court went on to hold that in order "[tlo exhaust remedies, a prisoner 
must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules 
require." Id. Because the prisoner failed to file a timely grievance, the Court determined that the 
prisoner had not exhausted his administrative remedies and prison officials were not obligated to 
entertain his appeal. Id. 
Both Drennon and Pozo held that inmates are only entitled to a response to a 
grievance if the grievance is timely and sufficiently submitted. Drennon, 145 Idaho at 603-04; Pozo, 
286 F.3d at 1025. Consequently, Defendants are only required to respond to grievances that are 
timely filed and comply with ICC's procedural requirements. Thus, ICC's response to Butters' 
grievance is only relevant if Butters submitted a timely grievance. As already established, Butters 
never filed a grievance with ICC and even if he did the grievance was untimely. Butters alleged that 
he was assaulted on October 5 and October 15, 2007. The therefore had fifteen days - or until 
October 20 or October 30,2007, respectively - to submit a grievance. However, Butters admits that 
he did not submit a grievance until November 10, 2007. R., pg. 94. In so doing, Butters filed an 
untimely grievance. As a result, Butters failed to properly exhaust his remedies in accordance with 
Drennon and Pozo, and ICC was not required to respond to his untimely and deficient grievance. 
4. Plaintiff's Claim That ICC Prevented him From Filing a Timely 
Grievance is Inadmissible, Contradictorv. and Faetuallv Inaccurate 
On appeal, Butters claims he did not file timely concern or grievance forms with ICC 
because he was in administrative segregation following the alleged assaults and ICC staff did not 
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provide him with the proper forms until October 30,2007. Appellant's Br. at 3. This allegation is 
not only contradictory with his previous statements and factually incorrect, it is also inadmissible. 
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party may not 
rest on allegations in the pleadings, but must produce evidence by affidavit or deposition to 
contradict the assertions of the moving party. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 176 
(1974). A non-moving party may not rely on general or conclusory allegations unsupported by 
specific facts, particularly where opposing affidavits set forth specific and otherwise uncontroverted 
facts. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,902 (1997). Rather, a party must provide factual details of 
specificity equal to those furnished by his opponent. Bob Daniels andSon v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 
541 (1984). 
In the present case, Butters' claim that ICC prevented him from submitting timely 
concern and grievance forms is improper, as he rests solely on his pleadings and failed to produce 
any "evidence by affidavit" supporting his conclusory allegation. See I.R.C.P. 56(e); Worthen, 96 
Idaho at 176. When Butters filed his Complaint, he never once mentioned that he was unable to 
submit timely concern and grievance forms because he was in administrative segregation or because 
he was not provided the appropriate forms. R., pg. 5-14. Likewise, whenButters filed his affidavit, 
he never once mentioned he was prevented from submitting a timely grievance. He instead waited 
to first mention the allegation at a hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment before the 
district court. This proves problematic for Butters, as I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that a non-moving 
I 
I party to a motion for summary judgment may not "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that 
party's pleadings," but instead must set forth by affidavit "specific facts showing that there is a 
i I 
genuine issue for trial." Because Butters never claimed in either his Complaint or affidavit that he 
i 
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was prevented from filing timely concern or grievance forms, he failed to comply with Rule 56(e) 
and his allegation should be dismissed along with his appeal. 
Even if this Court chooses not to disregard Butters' allegation, it is important to note 
that the allegation is not supported by any evidence, it is contradictory with Butters' previous 
statements, and it is factually inaccurate. As a preliminary matter, Butters' timing in claiming that 
he was prevented from submitting a grievance is, at best, suspicious. Butters never made the 
allegation in his Complaint, his affidavit, or his Reply Brief to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Instead he first advanced the unswom allegation at a hearing before the district court on 
July 9,2009 to consider Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing, Butters stated 
that he did not submit a timely grievance for the alleged October 5,2007 until October 30 because 
he "did not have access to anything until the 18" [of October]." Tr., July 9,2009 Hearing, pg. 3, L. 
Eight days after the hearing, on July 17,2009, the district court granted Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R., pg. 122-131. In so doing, the Court stated: 
During the hearing on the motion, Plaintiff claimed that he was 
unable to file a grievance until October 18,2007 because he had been 
in SMUfrom the time of the first incident until that October 18,2007 
with the exception of thirty minutes. However, Plaintiff did not 
establish why he could not have immediately filed a grievance to 
meet the October 20,2007 deadline for the first incident or why he 
could not have filed a grievance by October 30,2007 for the second 
incident. 
R., pg. 129. 
Following the district court's decision, Butters changed his story. On July 30,2009, 
he filed a Motion to Reconsider with the district court. R., pg. 122-135. In the motion, rather than 
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stating he was unable to file a grievance until October 18, Butters instead claimed in an unswoni 
briefing that October 30, 2007 was the "first time [he] had a chance to do anything about either 
assault." R., pg. 132-33. 
In his appellate brief, Butters changed his story yet again. He now claims that after 
he was placed in administrative segregation following the first alleged assault, he requested a 
concern form from ICC staff. However, he alleges that he was not provided a form because "they 
did not have any available to give him." Appellant's Br. at 3. He also claims that "[ilt wasn't until 
October 30, 2007 when staff gave him a concern form to submit." Id. Curiously, Butters never 
mentioned any of these allegations in any of his concern, grievance, or appeal forms. Furthermore, 
none of these newly-created explanations are made in a sworn affidavit, but only through unsworn 
testimony. 
Butters' three separate renditions of the same allegation are not enough to raise a 
genuine issue of fact for trial regarding his ability to file a timely grievance form. In order to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party must "come forward with evidence 
by way of affidavit or otherwise which contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party . . 
. ." Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Sews., Inc., 147 Idaho 378,383 (2009). Rather than coming forward 
with evidence by way of affidavit contradicting Defendant's evidence, Butters instead comes forward 
with a conclusory allegation by way of a pleading that contradicts his own previous statements. 
Moreover, Butters'evolving allegation does not fully-explain why he failed to submit 
a timely concern or grievance form. Butters could have filed a grievance on October 5, 2007 
following the first altercation and he could have filed one the next day before he was placed in 
administrative segregation. Additionally, Butters admitted at the hearing before the district court that 
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he had access to the grievance process beginning on October 18,2007. However, he fails to explain 
why he did not file a grievance at that time. Furthermore, Butters' allegation that he was unable to 
procure any grievance forms from ICC staff is not delineated with any specificity, let alone any 
"specific facts" as required by Rule 56(e). See Cameron, 130 Idaho at 902. He does not mention 
when he asked for the forms, who he asked, or whether he ever once followed up for a form 
following his initial request. 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that Butters failed to produce any evidence by 
affidavit supporting his claim that he was prevented from submitting a timely grievance with ICC 
staff. Moreover, his vague and ever-evolving allegation is conclusory, contradictory and factually 
inaccurate. Therefore, Butters' appeaI must be dismissed, as he failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies. 
B. Defendants are Entitled to an Award of Costs and Attornev Fees for 
Defending Against Plaintiff's Frivolous Appeal 
Under LC. 3 12-121 and I.A.R. 41, this Court may grant attorney fees to the 
prevailing party. I.C. 5 12-121 provides in pertinent part: "In any civil action, the judge may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, 
repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees." An award 
of attorney fees is appropriate when the court is left with "the abiding belief that the appeal has been 
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Drennon, 145 Idaho at 604 
(citing Rendon v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
In the present case, Butters failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing 
his lawsuit. The facts definitively establish that Butters (1) neglected to submit an inmate concern 
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form for the alleged October 5,2007 assault until ten days after the filing deadline; (2) neglected to 
submit an inmate concem form for the alleged October 15,2007 assault until nearly a year after the 
filing deadline; and (3) never properly submitted a grievance form for any alleged assault as required 
by ICC's grievance policy. Even if we accept, arguendo, Butters' unsupported claim that he 
submitted a grievance form with ICC, it is important to note that Butters admits that he failed to 
comply with ICC's filing deadlines. 
As already discussed, ICC's grievance policy required Butters to submit both a 
concem form and a grievance form within fifteen days of the incident giving rise to the grievance. 
Thus, he had until October 20,2007 to file a grievance form for the October 5 altercation, and until 
October 30, 2007 to file a grievance form for the October 15 altercation. Butters, however, 
specifically admits that he submitted a grievance form with ICC on November 10,2007, Appellant's 
Br. at 2, despite the fact that filing deadline had already expired. In clear violation of Idaho's inmate 
exhaustion statute, see LC. 5 19-4206(1), Idaho case law, see Drennon, 145 Idaho at 604, as well as 
a wealth of United States Supreme Court case law, see Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93-95, Butters failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies, in that he failed to comply with ICC's filing deadlines. 
At every step of the litigation process, Butters has utterly failed to produce any 
evidence suggesting that he complied with the simple and well-established mandate set forth in 
Idaho's inmate exhaustion statute. Nonetheless, he continues to pursue his frivolous claim with 
conclusory allegations and evolving explanations. Yet, he still fails to legally justify his failure to 
comply with Idaho law prior to filing his lawsuit. Thus, Defendants request attorney fees for the 
time, expense, and burden of defending against his claim, which is clearly frivolous, unreasonable, 
and without foundation. 
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v. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts co~iclusively show that Butters failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
prior to filing his claim. Butters neglected to timely comply with ICC's three-step grievance process 
in that he failed to (1) submit an inmate concern form for the alleged October 5,2007 assault until 
ten days after the filing deadline; (2) neglected to submit an inmate concern form for the alleged 
October 15, 2007 assault until nearly a year after the filing deadline; and (3) never properly 
submitted a grievance form for any alleged assault as required by ICC's grievance policy. 
Additionally, Defendants' were not obligated to respond to Butters' untimely and procedurally 
deficient grievance forms. Lastly, Butters' claim that ICC prevented him from filing a timely 
grievance is inadmissible, contradictory, and factually inaccurate. Therefore, Butters' failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies and his appeal must be dismissed. We also request this Court 
award attorney fees and costs to Defendants. 
DATED this 31d day of May, 2010. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
ndantsIRespondents 
Young, Villiarreal, Jepsen, 
Archibald, Chaney, Doser, Acosta, Fink, Green, 
Titsworth and McCall 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31d day of May, 2010, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing upon: 
Todd Allan Butters, #54276 - x U.S. Mail 
I.C.C., N-8-A - Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 70010 - Federal Express 
Boise, Idaho 83707 - Fax Transmission 
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APPENDIX A 
PAGE NUMBER: 
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DEPARTMENT 
OF 
C O R P C P T I ~ ~ I  
it is the policy of the ldaho Board of Correction that the ldaho Department of Correction 
provide a process that enables each offender to resolve problems and find answers to 
questions concerning the operation of the Department a s  It relates to the offender. It is 
the purpose of this policy to provide a responsive offender grievance process whereby 
the offender will be able to address complaints concerning the Idaho Department of 
Correction. 
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it is the purpose of this policy to provide a responsive offender grievanck process 
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Appellate authority. The facility head. (Also referred to as warden.) The appellate 
authority for medical grievances shall be fhe regional manager or regional vice ' 
president.employed by the contractor. 
lCC3 
Department Policy 318, Disciplinary Procedures. >+vw2 L*;2 
Board. The state Boanj of Correction. 
Department. The state Department of Correction. 
Facility. A building or residence, including.the property and land where the building or 
residence is located, owned or ieased and operated or managed by the Board or 
Department. 
Facility Head. The person with primary responsibllity to oversee, manage or.operate a 
Department facility. (Also referred to as Warden.) 
Offender. A person under the legal care, custody, supervision or authority of the Board 
including a person within or without the state.pursuant to agreement with another state 
or a contractor. 
Offender grievance. A written complaint by an offender or on the offender's behalf 
regarding a policy applicrabie within a facility, a condition in a facility, an action involving 
an offender of a facility, or an incident occurring within an facility. 
Reprisal. Any action or threat of action against anyone for the use of, or participation in, 
the grievance procedure. 
Reviewing Authority. T'he Deputy Warden. 
05.00.00. PROCEDURE 
., ,. 
The offender grievance process is a three-step process consisting of the Concern Form 
(See Attachment A, Offender Concern Form), the Grievance Form (See Attachment C, 
Offender Grievance Form), and the grlevance appeal. 
me offender grievance procedure may be used for complaints by offenders regarding 
Offenders are entitled to use the grievance procedure regardless of classification or 
restrictive housing status. 
L ' ,  8*!Jj 
[Law 
Li&J 
Reprisals ,against offenders who file offender grievances are strictly prohibited. 
Offenders have the right to file grievances against any employee for any reprisal 
resulting from the filing of a grievance. 




offender grievances shall be treated as  confidential and viewed only by staff o'n a 
need to know basis. 
r$:$ 
ail.policies, conditions of confinement, actions by employees, actions by other offenders ,"" ..-Jj 
and incidents occurring within the jurisdiction of the Department that affect the offender 
personaliy. Grievances about a disciplinary offense report are an exception and must be 
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Response to grievances shouid be returned40 the offend'er in a sealed envelope or 




An offender may only have three (3) grievances at one (1) time. 
The grievance coordinator shall submit a monthly report to the facility head showing the 
number of grievances filed by category and the number granted, modified, or denied. 
Grievance Categories are: 




Complaint Against Staff; 









Grievances and appeals shall be maintained by the grievance coordinator for five (5) 
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The written offender grievance procedure shaif be readily available to all offenders. 
Each offender shall, upon arrival at the facility, receive written notification and an oral 
explanation of the procedure, including the opportunity to have their questions regarding 
the procedure answered orally. The written procedure shall be available in any 
language spoken by a significant portion of the institution's population, Appropriate 
provisions shall be made for those speaking other languages and for the disabied or 
those requiring special accommodations. 
05.02.00. Offender Grievance Process 
Each facility shati create field memoranda explaining in detail the method of processing 
offender grievances. Each facility shall review its applicable field memoranda to ensure 
consistency with this directive. 
05.02.01. Offender Concern Form 
An offender shall try to solve an issue or problem informally by using a Concern Form 
before filing a grievance. 
The Concern Form must be handwritten. Typed Concern Forms will not be accepted. 
staff should respond within seven (7) working days of receiving an Offender Concern 
Form. 
05.02.02, Offender Grievance Form 
if the issue cannot be solved Informally, the offender may obtain a grievance form from 
the unit staff. 
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The grievance shali be filed within Ween (15) days of fhe incident or problem that is the 
basis of the grievance. The reviewing authority may exfend the time limit for up to sixty 
(60) days. 
Reasons for time limit extensions could include but are not limited to transfer of staff or 
offenders, sickness of staff or offender, staff vacation or other time off, loss of 
documentation. 
The offender shall fill out the grievance by hand legibly and completely. Typewritten 
grievances shall not be accepted. Steps taken to solve an issue shall be documented 
on the Offender Concern Form and attached to the grievance. 
The grlevance must contain all information relating to the nature of the complaint. The 
grievance mu& be specific as to dates, places, names of personnel involved, and how 
the offender has been adversely affected. 
The offender must state the action fhat the offender believes the reviewing authority 
should take. 
The grievance coordinator shall determine if the grievance has been correctly and 
completely filled out. 
If the grievance Is not correctly filled out, the grievance coordinator shall return the 
grievance to the offender using the GrievancelDOR Appeal Transmittal form (See 
Attachment B, GrievanceIDOR Appeal Transmittal.) 
- - - -- - - - - 
if the grievance is correctly filled out, the grievance shall be assigned to the most 
applicable staff, but not the same staff who responded to the concern. The coordinator 
shall number the grievance and log whom the grievance was assigned to. 
Log numbers will consist of a six (6) digit number. The first two (2) diglts indicate the 
facility, the second two (2) indicate the month, and the last two (2) the number of 
grievances received. As an example, if iMSl receives fifteen (15) grievances in the 
month of December, they would be numbemd 701201 through 107275. 
If the grievance is related to a medical issue, the section entitled "the response from the 
staff member being griived or in charge of the arealoperation being grievedu should be 
completed by healthcare staff employed by the contractor and supervised by the health 
services administrator, employed by the contractor. 
The section entitled "your grievance has been reviewed and I find," should be 
completed by the health services administrator employed by the contractor. 
The assigned staff shall answer the grievance and return it to the coordinator Vuithin sgi seven (7) working days. If staff fail to respond within the time frame, a reason should be .k.*Ii' 
provided in the staff response. 
&:.&A 
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All grievances shall be answered professionally and as clearly as possible. The 
assigned staff shall put his answer in the space provided on the grievance form. 
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The ~oordinator shall log when the assigned staff retums the grievance and forward the 
grievance to the reviewing authorify for a decision. 
The reviewing authority shall return the completed grievance to the grievance 
coordinator, wifhin fourteen (14) working days. 
@:#;J, 
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The institution grievance coordinator will ensure that thk facility head receives a copy of 
all grievance, appeals and responses. 
u ; L  
*;u: 
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The grievance coordinator shall then log the grievance and return the original (white) 
copy to the offender. 
The pink copy shall be forwarded to the Operations Deputy Administrator with the 
monthly Management Briefing report. 
The yellow copy shall be kept on file for five (5) years and then destroyed. 
05.03.00. Appeal Process 
~f the offender is not satisfied with the reviewing authority's response, the offender may 
appeal by returning the original (white) copy of the grievance to the grievance 
coodinator. The appeal must be filed within ten (10) days of the reviewing authority's 
resporise. 
The grievance coordinator will log the appeal and forward to the appellate authority. 
The appellate authoriiy for, medical grievances shall be the.regional manager or regional 
vice president employed by the contractor. The regional manager or regional vice 
president shall complete the section entitled, "your appeal has been reviewed and I 
find". The appellate authority shall respond and return the appeal to the grievance 
coardinaior. The grievance coordinator will log the appellafe authority's response and 
forward the completed appeal to the offender. The completed appeal shall be returned 
to the offender within fourteen (14) working days from receipt. If an extension is 
the offender shall receive written notification. 
if the grievance is related to .a medicai issue, the regional manager or regional vice 
president employed by the contractor shall forward copies of his responses to the 
\",v ,a 
Depafiment's medical seivices manager a; tba same time the responses are returiied to ~ f s  
t h e  institution grievance coordinator. In addition to copies of responses, the regional T R i 1  .4m4 
manager or regional vice president shall include copies of all documents (summaries, 
medical records, efc.) upoh which he relied to determine his decision. 
/say 
The appellate authority may forward the grievance appeal to the director or other 
division administrator when, in the opinion of the appellate authority, the resolution to 
the grievance is beyond the appellate authority's control. 
9-1~-04 
Administrator, Operations Date 
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HABEAS CORPUS AND INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION PROCEDURES 
ACT 
19-4206.PRISONERS REQUIRED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES IN CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT CASES. (1) Unless 
a petitioner who is a prisoner establishes to the 
satisfaction of the court that he is in imminent danger 
of serious physical injury, no petition for writ of 
habeas corpus or any other civil action shall be 
brought by any person confined in a state or county 
institution, or in a state, local or private 
correctional facility, with respect to conditions of 
confinement until all available administrative remedies 
have been exhausted. If the institution, or state, 
local or private correctional facility does not have a 
system for administrative remedy, this requirement 
shall be waived. 
(2) At the time of filing, the petitioner shall 
submit, together with the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus a true, correct and complete copy of any 
documentation which demonstrates that he has exhausted 
administrative remedies described in subsection (1) of 
this section. 
(3) If at the time of filing the petition for writ 
of habeas corpus the petitioner fails to comply with 
this section, the court shall dismiss the petition with 
or without prejudice . 
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